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The EU, Israel and the Arab
Awakening
Clashing perceptions, diverging policies?
Benedetta Berti and Caroline du Plessix
 
European and Israeli narratives: democracy “versus”
security?
Clashing perspectives on democracy in the MENA region
1 While both Israel and the EU Member States share a formal commitment to democracy
and  to  upholding  liberal  values,  still  their  reactions  to  the  Arab  Awakening  varied
substantially. Specifically their respective assessments on both the democratic potential
of  the  revolutions  and  the  importance  of  promoting  democracy  in  the  Middle  East
strongly differed.
2 At the core, both the EU and Israel share ‘liberal democracies’ values and their bilateral
relations benefit from this. Yet Israel is not a ‘secular democracy,’ contrary to most of the
EU  Member  States.  In  Israel,  religious  political  parties  are  structurally  part  of  the
democratic system,1 and there is no clear-cut separation between State and religion. From
this point of view, Israel would seem to be better equipped than the EU to understand
some of the challenges that need to be tackled by Tunisia, Libya and Egypt when it comes
to finding a balance between politics and religion and to determining the role Islam
should  play  in  the  new societies.  The  Israeli  case  could  even be  used to  argue  that
democracy does not necessarily presuppose secularization. This is the case, although one
of the domestic ‘acid tests’ of Israel’s democracy is its commitment to ensuring de facto
civil and political rights to its minorities. What is more, it can also be argued that often
democracy comes after security in the Israeli government’s hierarchy of values. 
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3 Concerning  their  respective  narrative  of  the  Arab  Awakening,  EU  Member  States
generally  adopted  a  long  term  approach  to  democratization  in  the  MENA  region.
Perceptions in Europe may be summarized in the following quote from Olivier Roy: 
“Whatever ups and down may follow, we are witnessing the beginning of a process
by which democratization is becoming rooted in Arab societies. (…) The Islamists
parties may have more power and freedom to maneuver,  but they too will  find
themselves being pushed to adjust to the democratization process.”2
4 In other words, Europeans initially displayed both optimism and empathy towards the
revolutions.  For instance,  Ralf  Hexel,  the former head of  the German Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung in Israel, pointed out that in Germany there was a real feeling of empathy and
identification with the youth in Tahrir square. Parallels were drawn between the 2011
events in the Arab world and recent European history. French historian Benjamin Stora,
for example, compared the Arab Awakening with the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall in Europe
as well as with the 1974 revolution in Portugal.3 Professor Fréderic Charillon underlined
that it is no longer possible to provide to the regimes in power the monopoly on the
political representation of their states. In other words, the recent events demonstrated
that the centrality of the political power did not annihilate the social dynamic.4
5 Yet,  by late 2011 the mood in Europe had somewhat darkened. The aftermath of the
elections in Tunisia and in Egypt and the Islamists’ rise to power, together with the state
of relative chaos in Libya and Syria did lead a number of European politicians to make
more  cautious  statements.  Henri  Guaino,  former  special  advisor  to  Former  French
President Nicolas Sarkozy, declared that: “we may have made an error in judgment. (…)
The rest of the story has not been as beautiful as we may have thought at the beginning.”5
6 It is worth noting that the uprisings were mainly secular and that Islamist parties such as
Ennahda in Tunisia or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt made their entry only at a later
stage.  Moreover these parties benefited from their established political  structure and
network,  in  stark  contrast with  the  lack of  unity  and  political  experiences  of  the
emerging political movements. This assessment made Štefan Füle, the EU Commissioner
for Enlargement and ENP, declare in 2012: 
“We are in this for the long haul (…). When I was last in the region I was told that
successful  transition  would  not  be  measured  by  the  first  rounds  of  democratic
elections but by the second third and fourth rounds. We must engage with the new
leaderships and work together on building solid foundations for democracy and
inclusive growth.”6
7 Yet, despite this new European empathy towards the Arab people’s fate, it still remained
unclear  whether  the EU and  the  Arab  protestors  spoke  the  same  language.  The  EU
discourse conveyed, at least at the beginning, a procedural understanding of democracy,
calling  for  new elections,  whereas  the  protestors’  demands  were  initially  more  of  a
substantial nature, demanding freedom, dignity and justice.7 Furthermore, in order to
better understand the protestors’ demands, the EU should come to terms with certain
preconceived  notions,  such  as  the  idea  that  a  democrat must  be  a  liberal  or  that
democracy necessarily presupposes secularization.8
8 Conversely,  in Israel,  it  seemed clear from the beginning that “things will  get  worse
before they get better.”9 This perception was especially strong when looking at political
transformations taking place in Egypt, which were seen as particularly worrisome for
Israel. In April 2012 Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that “what we
hope to see is the European Spring of 1989. We could find that the Arab Spring turns into
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an Iranian winter.”10 He added that Teheran was trying to cash in on the mass uprising,
exploiting the regional changed to improve its status and power within MENA.
9 Accordingly, due to security concerns and to its particular geopolitical position, there was
from the outset a general uneasiness in Israel towards the prospect of a democratization
of  its  Arab  neighbors.  Relying  on  both  realpolitik  and  strategic  assessments,  Israeli
analysts pointed out that the Arab Awakening would lead to the rise of Islamist political
parties hostile to Israel, and to the weakening of the pragmatists (the useful autocrat, in
other words). This perception was especially strong before the ousting and downfall of
Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, in July 2013. There was also the fear that Islamist
parties would translate their anti-Israeli posture into foreign policy. For instance, the
new elected government in Tunisia invited Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in January 2012,
though no cooperation steps were taken at the political level after the meeting. Yet the
concern about the growing role of Islamist parties and the mostly pro-status quo attitude
explain why, at the beginning of the Egyptian revolution, Israel hoped that the Mubarak
regime would weather the storm and survive. 
10 The assessment was somewhat different on Syria,  with a stronger internal debate on
whether the status quo would benefit Israel,  but overall  the debate was still  strongly
centered on security, rather than democratic potential. What’s more, Retired IDF Major
General Giora Eiland reminded that, according to Ariel Sharon in his day, the stabilization
of Syria under a more or less democratic regime with a pro-western orientation would
not necessarily be an asset for Israel. Ariel Sharon claimed that having a democratic Syria
at its borders could imply the need to seriously negotiate on the Golan.11 Yet, President
Shimon Peres expressed an opposite view on the impact of regional democratization for
Israel: “Poverty and oppression in the region have fed resentment against Israel and the
better our neighbors will have it, we shall have better neighbors.”12 
11 Thus, the Israeli government’s security concerns do not prevent lively debates to take
place domestically about what steps the country needs to take in order to improve its
regional standing, notably on the Palestinian issue. The events in the Arab world might
increase western countries’ attention and distress over the lack of progress in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. Yet, within the Israeli government, the Palestinian issue is not
at the forefront of the domestic agenda and security debate, which currently prioritize
the Iranian nuclear threat and the northern and southern fronts with Syria and Egypt.
There is a sense in the EU that as long as the post-67 Israeli occupation of Palestinian
territories persists, a normalization of relations between Arab societies and Israel cannot
take place. Thus, according to some European voices, the Arab awakening should trigger a
change in Israeli priorities.13 This argument has also been made from within Israel, with
political analysts arguing that Israel needs “to ease the burden on the residents of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and inter alia, to reach understandings with Hamas (…) and
withdraw its objection in principle to a thaw in relations between Fatah and Hamas.”14
12 Yet, it is also worth noting that the EU invested relatively more political energy to cope
with the upheavals in the Arab states than to engage with the Palestinian question in this
context. As a matter of fact, much more space was devoted from 2011 onwards to the
Arab states concerned by the Arab Awakening in the declarations of the EU Council of
Foreign affairs. Moreover, the Member States’ contributions to the financial mechanisms
dedicated to the Palestinian Authority, PEGASE, and more particularly its direct financial
support, dropped by 22% from 2011 to 2012.15 The context of economic crisis in Europe
provides the main explanation for the relative decreasing EU funding to the PA that still
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accounted for 451.7 million euros in 2012.  Despite all  this,  Lady Ashton, the EU high
representative for foreign affairs and security policy, recalled that ending the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict remained even in this context a “high priority and a fundamental EU
interest”16.Overall,  however,  looking  at  the  European  and  Israeli  narratives  on  the
democratic potential and impact of the Arab Awakening, it appears clear that there was a
clash in perceptions between the EU and Israel. This gap narrowed as the events unfolded
but remained significant. A deeper understanding of the different European and Israeli
interests, especially defined in security terms, will help understanding this divergence. 
 
The Arab Awakening from a Security Perspective
13 By and large, EU Member States’ and Israel’s assessments of the Arab Awakening have
been guided by their different national security interests,  as well as by the diverging
understanding of the evolving political and social dynamics in the region, thus leading to
distinct, and at times contrasting, security assessments.
14 Overall, Israel has been far more risk-adverse with respect to the Arab Awakening, both
in its security assessment of the revolutions as well as in crafting its actual policies to
cope with the changes at the regional level.  This disparity in framing can in turn be
explained  by  analyzing  the  different  geo-strategic  position  and  security  interests  of
Israeli and European counterparts: Israel is far closer – both geographically as well as
geo-strategically – to the states concerned by the Arab Awakening and, as such, any sharp
deterioration in regional stability would inevitably and directly affect the country. Simply
put, the stakes are much higher for Israel: for example, a collapse of the peace treaties
with either Jordan or Egypt as a result of the regional turmoil could have an incredibly
negative impact on the country’s regional position and domestic security.
15 What is more, Israel – unlike its European counterparts – already had generally tense and
complex relations with virtually all its neighbors, with the notable exception of Jordan
and, to a lesser extent, with the Egyptian government under Mubarak. In this context,
Israel feared that regional instability would rock the already fragile equilibrium. 
16 Finally, Israel’s scarce and antagonistic relations with the rest of the region also account
for  its  pessimism  in  evaluating  the  Arab  Awakening.  In  contrast,  from  a  European
perspective,  the  more  extensive  – although  at  times  still  problematic  – relationship
between  European  Member  States  and  the  Middle  East,  both  at  the  government-to-
government as well as at the civil society level, puts the EU Member States in a position to
have  both  a  better  knowledge  and  a  more  nuanced  understanding  of  the  evolving
dynamics taking place within the Arab world.
17 In other words, the different national security interests, geo-strategic positions, and past
and  current  state  of  relations  can  account  for  the  distinct  European-Israeli  security
assessments of the regional revolutions. 
18 Israel’s  security  assessment  has  been directly  informed by the country’s  concern for
preserving regional stability in general, and the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan in
particular. This national security-driven approach explains why changes in a ‘peripheral’
country like Tunisia were generally downplayed,17 while the crisis and subsequent regime
change in Egypt – a country crucial to Israel’s regional standing and security – were met
with considerable uneasiness. Similar attention was also devoted to the ongoing political
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protests in Syria, particularly in light of the shared border and the country’s historically
important role in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
19 Firstly, Israel has been concerned about the rise in volatility in the region, with the Israeli
government  repeatedly  expressing  concern  for  heightened  regional  instability,  and
openly wishing for “stability to be restored.”18 Specifically, the Israeli government was
interested in both the preservation of the peace treaties and the continuation of the
status quo in Jordan. This perceived regional instability drove the Israeli Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu to state that – give the uncertain dynamics in the region – Israel
should more than ever bet on its own defense and national security.19
20 A second,  related,  security  concern  has  been  for  the  increasing  state  weakness  and
breakdown of central authority in post-revolutionary countries, with a special focus on
Egypt.  The  fact  that  states  in  the  Middle  East  have  overall  been  ‘weaker’  since  the
beginning of the Arab Awakening spells trouble for Israel as the country worries about
increasingly more porous borders, the rise in power and influence of non-state armed
groups,  and the increase in trafficking of weapons. The case of Sinai  is  an especially
powerful example of the connection between weak state control and the proliferation of
both armed groups and weapons, resulting in a direct – albeit not strategic – threat to
Israel’s security. Understandably, these fears were further heightened in August 2011 and
again August 2012, following two high-profile terrorist attacks originating within Sinai.
21 Thirdly, especially before the overthrowing of the Morsi government in Egypt, Israel’s
security assessment of the Arab Awakening was also informed by the country’s concerns
for the rise of Islamist parties in post-revolutionary countries, from Tunisia to Egypt.
Israel  interpreted the rise of  political  Islam as a problematic development,  expecting
increased ideological  rigidity,  reluctance to deal  with Israel,  and a  rise  in anti-Israel
feelings across the region. The growing power of the Muslim Brotherhood was initially
met with a great deal of reluctance, fearing for the stability of the peace treaty as well as
anticipating the rise of a Hamas-Ikhwan alliance which would embolden the Islamic party
in  Gaza.  In  the  end,  although  neither  of  these  fears  proved  well-founded,  still  the
Egyptian government under now-former President Morsi did invest in making the peace
between Egypt and Israel even colder, de facto freezing all relations other than in the
field of security and intelligence cooperation.
22 In this context of heightened security concerns for regional stability and for preserving
the status quo, the civil war in Syria has been at the center of an especially animated
debate. The Israeli government has been worried about instability and state weakness,
fearing the collapse of the Syrian state and the potential creation of a power vacuum next
to the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. This scenario is especially worrisome given the
increasing number of foreign jihadists involved in the Syrian civil war. The conflict has
also  been  seen  as  destabilizing  at  the  regional  level,  with  Israel  being  particularly
concerned  about  the  stability  of  neighboring  states  like  Jordan  – increasingly  under
pressure due to the country’s own economic crisis and the massive influx of refugees
seeking shelter in the Hashemite Kingdom.
23 Security concerns have also shaped the debate regarding which of the warring parties
engaged in the civil war in Syria would represent a ‘least bad option’ for Israel. On the one
hand, part of the Israeli defense and security establishment has argued that the downfall
of the regime of Bashar al-Assad would not favor Israel, noting how the Assads had – by
and large – shown both restraint and predictability, displaying no interest in a direct
confrontation with Israel and striving to preserve calm at the border. On the other hand,
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there has also been a second, anti-status quo, camp that has been arguing that Assad’s fall
would actually represent a positive development for Israel, since it would deliver a blow
to Iran, weaken Hezbollah, and improve Israel’s immediate security environment.
24 The security assessments and discussions in Europe have also focused on the heightened
regional  risks  resulting  from  increased  volatility,  state  weakness,  proliferation  of
weapons and armed groups, and rising number of foreign jihadists fighting against Assad
in Syria. Overall, European discussions have highlighted a serious concern for regional
stability,  which is well  in line with the idea – expressed in the Barcelona Declaration
– that  the  Mediterranean  should  become  a  “common  area  of  peace,  stability  and
prosperity.”20
25 European concerns for increased state weakness in the MENA region, and especially in
North Africa, have also been voiced over the past three years, especially in the context of
the indirect threats that this trend could pose to European security, through increasing
the risks in terms of smuggling of weapons, drugs, and people, as well as undermining
counter-terrorism and anti-criminal policies.
26 Yet,  overall,  the  discussion  regarding  the  security  threats  derived  from  the  Arab
Awakening  has  gone  hand-in-hand with  a  generally  more  optimist  tone  than Israeli
counterparts, highlighting the positive aspects of the revolutions.21 Accordingly, concerns
over regional instability have been balanced with statements regarding the importance of
supporting the post-revolutionary transition. 
27 In turn, this leads to affirming that overall the Israeli and European narratives on the
Arab Awakening, while converging on certain topics, have diverged over the different
weight each party has put on both the importance of preserving regional stability as well
as on the dominance of national security considerations over broader political ones.
 
European and Israeli policies: ‘do what you must,
come what may’
28 Despite these clashing narratives regarding the consequences of the Arab Awakening, it
appears that  in their  respective policy,  the EU,  its  Member States,  and Israel  are all
pursuing a common objective: preserving their own interests in the region or, in other
words, endeavoring not to ‘miss the boat.’
 
An assessment of the EU’s and the EU3’s policies
29 Contrary to Israel, it turns out that remaining passive and not interfering in the process
was not a strategic option for Member States, and more particularly for France and the
United Kingdom. Overall,  Member States proved to be better armed to tackle shifting
political dynamics in the region from a hard power perspective, whereas, from a soft
power one, EU common tools could turn out to be especially useful in the long run. 
30 With regards to the EU3’s reactions, despite hesitant beginnings, they all proved willing
to  defend  their  security  and  political  interests.  This  attitude  can  be  exemplified  by
France’s foreign policy with respect to the Arab Awakening. To better understand the
French policy, it is worth reminding that the country has substantial influence in the
MENA region, and especially in the Maghreb, and that France’s role in the region has a
direct  impact  on its  international  status  as  a  global  actor.22 Yet,  France’s  diplomacy
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started badly with a  disastrous first  response in the case of  Tunisia.  On the 11th of
January 2011, during the initial demonstrations, Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie
alluded to a possible cooperation at the security level with the Tunisian government’s
security forces. She had to resign at the end of February 2011. This first reaction helps to
better understand French military interventionism in Libya, together with the United
Kingdom. President Nicolas Sarkozy rushed into urging Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi,  the
Libyan leader, to resign and face trial before the International Criminal Court. Thus, one
could even speak of an instrumentalization of the Libyan case by France to erase from
Arab memory its  own attitude towards Tunisia  and its  very cautious reaction in the
aftermath of Egypt leader Hosny Mubarak’s decision to resign in February 2011. 
31 France  and  the  United  Kingdom  then  decided  to  sponsor  the  UN  Security  Council
resolution 1973, enabling NATO to intervene in Libya for the “protection of civilians and
civilian populated areas.”23 This international intervention, starting on the 19th of March
and finishing at the end of October 2011(and despite Germany’s abstention) demonstrates
that, when it comes to employing hard power, NATO as a military alliance led by a small
coalition of Member States – among which France and the United Kingdom – remains
better equipped than the EU as a whole. It is also worth noting that the unity of purpose
between  the  United  Kingdom  and  France  was  facilitated  by  a  preceding  military
rapprochement and by the fact that, contrary to the Iraqi case, the American factor was
not here a source of divergence.
32 In this sense, British Foreign secretary, William Hague, described the Arab unrest as a
major test for the EU to bring more democracy and stability in the MENA region, adding
that  “if  we don’t  succeed,  the dangers  to the EU of  instability  or  extremism on our
frontiers are immense.”24
33 With respect to Syria, though all Member States recognized diplomatically the National
Coalition  for  Syrian  Revolutionary  and  Opposition  Forces  as  the  legitimate
representatives  of  the  aspiration of  the  Syrian People  during  the  19th of  November
European Council, divisions remained and prevented a common European strategy to be
drawn up. 
34 The bone of contention among Member States first concerned the military support to
provide the Rebels with. Before the 22nd of April 2013 Foreign Affairs Council of the EU,
France – who was one of the first Member States to recognize the legitimacy of Syrian
opposition – and the UK hoped to convince other Member States (especially Germany) to
lift the arms embargo to Syria that had been in place since May 2011. Yet, the growing
divisions within the opposition and the steady rise of pro-Al-Qaeda factions within the
anti-Assad ranks raised fears that the weapons provided to fight Assad would fall into the
wrong hands.  At  the  EU level,  during  the  April  2013  Foreign Affairs  Council,  it  was
decided to lift partially the oil embargo so as “to help the civilian population and support
the opposition.”25 Despite other Member States’  opposition to lift  the arms embargo,
France and the United Kingdom managed to block an extension of the arms embargo in
the May 2013 Foreign Affairs Council, so that this specific sanction was not renewed. Yet,
these Member States notably made a commitment that the “sale,  supply,  transfer or
export of military equipment (…) will be for the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition
and Revolutionary Forces and intended for the protection of civilians.”26
35 Then, in the aftermath of the chemical attack of the 21st of August 2013 carried out in the
outskirts of Damascus, the subject of dispute among Member States turned out to be the
possibility of a military strike against Syria. On the 22nd of August, Laurent Fabius, the
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French Foreign Minister, defended this option and he declared that, if forces loyal to
Syria’s President Bashar Assad were responsible for the massacre: “We need a reaction by
the international community, a reaction of force.”27
36 Yet,  while  the  United  Kingdom’s  Prime  Minister  David  Cameron  shared  the  French
position, the UK parliament, in an unexpected move, voted against a government motion
endorsing a military action against Syria on the 29th of August. The possibility of a US-led
strike stirred unpleasant memories among the British MPs.  As questions were raised
about the intelligence underpinning the strike, the Prime Minister conceded: “In the end
there is no 100 percent certainty about who is responsible.” At the same time, the PM
confirmed to be “as certain as possible” regarding Bashar el-Assad’s responsibility for the
chemical attack.28 It is crystal clear that the 2003 Iraqi precedent – when British MPs were
presented with what turned out as an inaccurate assessment regarding the presence of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq on the eve of the war – strongly influenced
the 2013 vote.
37 Germany’s  government  and  Foreign  Minister  Guido  Westerwelle  were  unsurprisingly
cautious  and  vague  in  their  statements  concerning  a  possible  German  support  to  a
military operation in Syria. While France declared that it was still committed to a firm
military action after the British vote, the German government’s spokesperson, Steffen
Seibert,  declared :  “We have not considered it  and we are not considering a military
strike.”29 Yet, he added that the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, emphasized during a
conversation  with  Russian  President  Vladimir  Putin,  that  “the  inhumane  poison  gas
attack against Syrian civilians requires an international reaction.”30 As a matter of fact,
Angela Merkel found herself in an uneasy position as she did not want to alienate German
voters before the September 2013 elections, and at the same time was unwilling to upset
the American ally after the German abstention concerning the conflict in Libya.
38 While the EU3 remained divided on the option of a military attack in Syria, the EU High
Representative Catherine Ashton, following an informal meeting of EU Foreign Ministers
in  Vilnius,  attempted to  save  face  by  expressing  an EU consensus:  “Strong evidence
[shows] that the Syrian regime is responsible for these attacks as it is the only one that
possesses chemical weapons agents and means of their delivery in a sufficient quantity.”31
39 The September 14, 2013 US-Russia led agreement committing Syria to swiftly get rid of its
chemical  arsenal  permitted  the  Member  States  to  reach  a  new  consensus,  while
postponing the prospect of a military strike. During the October 2013 EU Foreign Affairs
Council Member States all agreed to support the difficult mission of the Organization for
the  Prohibition  of  Chemical  weapons  (OPCW),  in  charge  of  achieving  the  complete
elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons by mid-2014.32
40 Overall, the functions of the EU for the Member States were threefold in the context of
the Arab upheavals: discursive, by providing a forum where the 28 Member States could
reach a consensus, but also punitive and normative. In fact, the EU also permitted the
Member States to overcome their disagreements by adopting common sanctions against
different  Arab  regimes  and  by  providing  strong  economic  and  political  baking  to
protestors. 
41 Sanctions turned out to be the main common tool at the EU level. This instrument has
been used since  2011 in  Tunisia  “to  freeze  funds  and economic  resources  of  certain
persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds, and natural or legal
persons or entities associated with them”; in Egypt for the same purpose in 2011 (and
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then amended in 2012); and again in 2011 in Libya for the same purpose and to place a
ban on exporting arms and equipment that could have been used for internal repression
before Qaddafi’s death. In the case of Syria there is a much longer list of sanctions, which
somehow reflects the divisions among Member States about a potential intervention on
the ground: it includes an embargo on weapons and equipment which can be used for
internal repressions (for the regime), and restrictions on persons, trade, investments,
payments,  and  financial  support…in  total  22  sets  of  restrictive  measures  since  the
beginning of the conflict.33 Yet, the effectiveness of these sanctions may be rationally
called into question as they still have not had a meaningful impact on the position of the
Syrian regime.
42 Through  the  EU,  Member  States  were  also  able  to  provide  stronger  diplomatic  and
economic backing to Arab movements so as to attempt countering former accusations of
carrying out  a  double  standard policy  in the MENA region.34 In  fact,  the  EU council
stepped in quickly to support these movements diplomatically and sent more consistent
messages in support of democratic forces in the region. For instance, in the case of Egypt,
as  soon as  the  4th  of  February  2011:  “The  European council  called  on the  Egyptian
authorities  to  meet  the  aspirations  of  the  Egyptian people  with  political  reform not
repression.”35
43 Moreover,  the  EU  adopted  different  incentives  to  move  towards  a  new  form  of
engagement with respect to the MENA region. The new incentives can be summarized as
the ‘3 Ms’: More market access, more mobility, more money.36 Mandates for negotiating
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco
and Jordan were approved by the Council on 14 December 2011 to bring these countries
progressively  closer  to  the EU single  market.  What’s  more,  the  European Investment
bank’s (EIB) funding available for investment in the Southern Neighborhood has been
increased  by  1  billion  euros.  The  EBRD’s  (European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and
Development) lending mandate has also been extended to cover the region, allowing for
2.5 billion euros in additional lending per year.
44 Mobility partnerships were initiated with Tunisia and Morocco – notably concerning visa
facilitations  –  to  increase  mobility,  with  for  instance  more  Erasmus  mundus  grants
provided. 
45 A Civil Society Facility was created – with 22 million euros for 2011-2013 – as well as an
European Endowment for  Democracy.  Yet,  it  is  worth noting that  the EU democracy
assistance  resources  still  have remained a  drop in  the  ocean compared with the  US
budget. A so called ‘Spring program’, that stands for Support for Partnership, Reform and
Inclusive Growth, allocated 350 million euros for the period 2011-2012 for the region. 
46 It remains to be seen, beyond the speeches, if the plethora of instruments introduced will
not prove to be empty shell  only echoing European distress towards the unexpected
regional  dynamics.  The  ‘3  Ms’  should  provide  actual  incentives  to  new transitioning
governments so as to attract them towards Europe in the long run and to answer those
critics who point out EU contradictions in its relation with former dictators. Otherwise,
the introduction of these new tools and initiatives could lead to deepen the “capacity-
expectation gap”37 created by the EU in its external action. 
47 Yet, it is worth noting that the unstable and opaque course of the political transitions
from  Libya,  to  Syria  and  Egypt  make  this  task  particularly  difficult.  For  instance,
concerning negotiations on a DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement)
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with Egypt –beyond the current EU-Egypt Association – exploratory discussions were held
in 2012 and a dialogue on the DCFTA was launched in June 2013. But, in the aftermath of
the overthrow of the Egyptian government in July 2013 by the Egyptian army, no other
meetings have been foreseen. This exemplifies the difficulty for the EU to live up to its
commitments in this unpredictable political context. 
 
Israeli Policy Responses to the Arab Awakening – An Assessment
48 The Israeli policy responses to the Arab Awakening and to the wave of social and political
changes that took the Middle East by storm have been informed by a desire to keep a low
profile  and  stress  the  country’s  interest  in  staying  out  of  its  neighbors’  political
transitions.
49 In turn, this policy stemmed from Israel’s understanding that its actual direct influence
and capacity to affect domestic politics in the Arab world were limited, at best. The Israeli
leadership was indeed aware of Israel’s own unpopularity in the region, which further
prevented  the  country  from  having  a  strong  direct  impact,  while  also  limiting  the
chances for Israel to directly back any of the emerging political groups, as that support
would also inevitably have hindered such groups’ domestic stance and legitimacy.38 
50 In  addition,  Israel  felt  it  was  important  to  stress  that,  in  its  own  reading  of  the
revolutions, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel’s policies with respect to the Occupied
Palestinian Territories was not a core driver or trigger of the protests. In the words of
Foreign Ministry Avigdor Liberman: “For years we have dealt with misrepresentations of
the conflict. Today, it is clear by what is happening in Syria and Egypt, that the problem is
primarily internal and domestic. It is not the conflict, or the Jews – it is the radical Islamic
wing in Arab society.”39
51 Israel’s policy of keeping a low-profile was certainly carried out with respect to Tunisia,
where the country overall abstained from making formal statements in support of either
Zine El  Abidine Ben Ali’s  regime or the opposition forces,  while still  emphasizing its
concern for regional stability.40 This same attitude was reiterated in the aftermath of the
revolution,  with the  exception of  some sporadic  and very  general  displays  of  public
support for the region’s yearning for a ‘democratic future.’41
52 But whereas by and large the revolution in Tunisia did not result in any drastic policy or
strategic shift  for Israel,  the same cannot be said when looking at the impact of  the
changes  occurring in  Egypt,  where  the downfall  of  Mubarak led to  a  shaky internal
transition, followed by the swift rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, and leaving the
country in a state of  deep internal  polarization and instability.  In this sense,  Israel’s
policy with respect to Egypt has mostly been minimalist, aiming at weathering the storm,
while  preserving  both  the  peace  treaty  as  well  as  the  generally  good  security  and
intelligence cooperation with the Egyptian security apparatus. 
53 In this context, the shaky security situation in Sinai has been seen especially problematic,
as the proliferation of weapons smuggling, trafficking, and terrorist activities in Sinai
represented both a security as well as a political threat to Israel. The latter has struggled
to balance its need to protect itself from any type of attack originating from within Egypt
with  the  necessity  of  preserving  the  peace  treaty  and  steering  clear  of  any  type  of
confrontation with its southern neighbor. As a result, Israel focused its Sinai policy on
investing on its own border security, while aiming at preserving security coordination.
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While relations with Egypt were more complex during the brief  reign of  the Muslim
Brotherhood, the post-Morsi interim government’s interests in curbing smuggling and
proliferation of arms groups in the Sinai are overall more in line with Israeli security
interests.
54 The  same  combination  of  boosting  domestic  security  while  preserving  a  minimalist
foreign policy can be observed with respect to Syria, where Israel’s condemnation for
Assad’s violent crackdowns on his own population have not been accompanied with an
open endorsement of the anti-government opposition forces. 
55 Indeed, Israel has repeatedly asserted not to be interested in becoming a direct party in
the ongoing civil war, while – at the same time – communicating a number of ‘redlines’
and hinting its  willingness to intervene directly to prevent the transfer of  advanced
weaponry to Hezbollah. In turn, reported Israeli attacks within Syria in the past year can
be interpreted as Israel’s acting on its own redlines and sending a signal to the Assad
regime regarding its unwillingness to accept large scale weapons transfers to its regional
foe, Hezbollah. The assumption behind this policy has largely been that such sporadic and
limited use of force would not drag Israel into the Syrian civil war. This assessment is also
shaped by the expectation that both Hezbollah as well  as the Assad regime – already
bogged down in their own domestic conflict – would not risk an all-out war with Israel by
responding to Israel’s attacks. 
56 In other words, the calculus on Syria has been that Israel can continue to remain an
external observer to the conflict, as limited use of force will not trigger retaliation, nor
will it lead to a significant escalation. Needless to say, this assumption has created an
extremely fragile equilibrium between Israel, the Assad regime, and Hezbollah.
57 Finally, in a brief excursus of Israeli policies with respect to the Arab Awakening, it is
important to mention the impact of the regional changes on the country’s policy with
respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict. On this front, even though Israel has been adamant in
de-linking the two issues,  as  already mentioned above,  still  it  is  hard to dispute the
connection between Israel’s policies with respect to Palestine and its uneasy regional
position. In this sense, looking forward, it appears evident that not addressing the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, including the issues of settlements in the West Bank and the current
refusal to deal with Hamas, lift the economic restrictions on Gaza, and encourage inter-
Palestinian reconciliation, will inevitably derail any effort to improve its political and
diplomatic  relations.  In  other  words,  Israel’s  position  in  the  region  remains  deeply
connected to its policies with respect to the Palestinians. The lack of a genuine peace




58 Notwithstanding diverging perceptions concerning the Arab Awakening, Israel and the
EU – including the Member States – were both very much concerned not  to lose out
substantially in the new balance of power created by the shifting regional dynamics.
While the EU and most of the Member States stepped in to express their solidarity to the
rebels in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, Israel remained cautious and kept a low profile,
also due to its own unpopularity in the region. For geopolitical reasons, and due to their
historical relations with Arab societies, EU and Israeli respective policies also strongly
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differed.  The  EU  and  Member  States  invested  significant  financial,  political  and
diplomatic resources in boosting their involvement and status in the region. Conversely,
Israel purposely remained relatively passive hoping that ‘the storm’ would pass without
worsening the state of its already complicated relation with its neighbors. 
59 Despite difficult beginnings, the EU managed to ‘go with the flow’ of the Arab Awakening
events.  At  the  Member  States’  level,  France  and  the  United  Kingdom  proved  their
capacity to act militarily in the European neighborhood when deemed necessary, such as
in the Libyan case,  despite the German veto.  At  the same time the current divisions
regarding Syria show that without a consensus among the EU3, not much can be done at
the EU level, with the exception of sanctions. Yet, the effectiveness of sanctions in the
Syrian case remains to be demonstrated. 
60 The EU had generally three functions for the Member States: punitive with the adoption
of  sanctions,  discursive  with  the  definition  of  general  consensus,  and  normative  by
providing a diplomatic and economic backing to protestors. 
61 Yet, Member States should make sure that EU instruments are not a mere substitute for
an actual common strategy towards the MENA region. The plethora of tools introduced
can make it more difficult for EU decision makers to identity an actual strategy aimed at
promoting stability in the region, no longer synonymous with the former status quo. The
Arab upheavals could instead provide a new opportunity to prove, in the aftermath of the
Lisbon Treaty, that the EU really enables Member States to increase the scope of their
foreign policy capacity, rather than undermining it.  The Lisbon Treaty, in force since
December 2009, aims notably at improving consistency in EU external action. Since then,
the Arab Awakening is the first big challenge Member States have had to face together.
Their answer should reflect the Lisbon objective by defining a common strategy, as well
as  identifying  specific  goals  based  upon  the  EU’s  as  well  as  Member  States’  power
resources. Otherwise, the numerous EU financial instruments introduced could turn out
to be counter-productive. 
62 Israel, for its part, is under a very different set of constraints and challenges. The country
perceived the increased instability in the MENA region as a potential security threat and
its  entire  policy  architecture  has  been  aimed  at  containing  potential  spillovers  and
instability  rather  than,  like  the  EU,  increasing  its  role  and  profile.  Yet,  complete
pessimism is not warranted, as there is still an expectation that, in the long run, the
affirmation of  democratic  forces  and the economic  and political  development  in  the
region would  overall  represent  an improvement  for  Israel.  Still,  there  is  widespread
skepticism toward the capacity of the Arab Awakening to deliver such results. 
63 These mixed feelings have resulted in an ambivalent posture toward the ongoing regional
transformations, characterized by a concern for stability,  an effort to boost domestic
defense, and a strategic retreat. In the longer term, there is a debate within the Israeli
society over what steps—starting with committing to deliver concrete progress in the
Israeli-Palestinian arena—the country needs to take in order to adopt a more proactive
attitude and improve its regional standing. 
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ABSTRACTS
Since late 2010, the so-called Arab Awakening has dramatically redefined the political and social
status quo in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. All the main regional players have
been affected – either directly or indirectly – by the mass-scale social and political upheaval, with
significant implications both at the regional and international level. 
Israel has been following the ongoing process of political transformation extremely carefully,
showing at the same time skepticism and anxiety, but also hope and empathy. At the policy level,
despite  notable  exceptions,  this  ambivalent  attitude  has  been  translated  in  a  generally
minimalist and pro-stability policy.
The European Union and its Member States also followed the Arab Awakening closely, rushing to
voice support  for the forces of  democratization active in the region.  The EU reaction to the
unfolding  revolutions  displayed two distinct  features:  at  a  ‘soft  power’  level,  the  EU rapidly
stepped in to support the Arab Spring movements, thus introducing new financial-democracy
assistance  instruments,  like  the  Civil  Society  Facility  and  the  European  Endowment  for
Democracy.  Yet  at  a  ‘hard  power’  level,  Member  States  remained  divided  and  oscillated
continuously between direct military support to the rebels and a ‘wait and see’ approach, first in
the Libyan case and now in Syria. 
The main aim of this article is to deconstruct and compare the dominant Israeli and European
narratives  on  the  Arab  Awakening,  focusing  especially  on  how  each  party  has  framed  the
revolutions and balanced between pro-democratic values and stability and security concerns. In
addition  to  comparing narratives,  the  study  also  analyzes  the  Israeli  and  European  policies
introduced  to  respond  to  the  double  challenge  and  opportunity  represented  by  the  Arab
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Awakening.
The  study  shows  that,  despite  clashing  perceptions  on  their  understanding  of  security  and
democracy in the region, the EU and its Member States – and more particularly the EU3, France,
Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  – and  Israel  reacted  to  the  upheavals  with  the  same
willingness to defend their interests and to adapt their policy to the new regional landscape. It
seems indeed that both actors have been focusing on how to benefit (or at least not lose out)
from this new MENA context. 
Depuis la fin de l’année 2010, le ‘Printemps arabe’ a entièrement redéfini le statu quo politique et
social de la région Moyen Orient et Afrique du Nord (MENA). L’ensemble des principaux acteurs
régionaux ont été touchés – de manière directe ou indirecte – par ces soulèvements sociaux et
politiques de masse. 
Israël  a  suivi  ce  processus de transformation politique avec une attention toute particulière,
faisant preuve à la fois de scepticisme et d’anxiété mais aussi d’espoir et d’empathie. Au niveau
politique, avec quelques exceptions notables néanmoins, cette attitude ambivalente s’est traduite
par une politique minimaliste et favorable au maintien de la stabilité.
L’UE et ses États membres, quant à eux, se sont empressés, plus ou moins rapidement, d’exprimer
leur  soutien  aux  forces  de  démocratisation  dans  la  région.  La  réaction  de  l’UE  envers  ces
révolutions en cours est dotée de deux caractéristiques distinctes : en premier lieu, dans le cadre
de  son  soft  power,  l’UE  est  intervenue  rapidement  afin  de  soutenir  ces  mouvements  en
introduisant notamment des instruments financiers visant à soutenir la démocratie, telle qu’un
dispositif  d’assistance  à  la  société  civile  ainsi  qu’un  fond  européen  pour  la  démocratie.
Néanmoins,  quant  à  l’exercice  d’un  éventuel  hard  power européen,  les  Etats  membres  ont
tergiversé et  sont restés  divisés  sur la  question de l’apport  d’un soutien militaire  direct  aux
rebelles, dans le cas libyen et ensuite sur le dossier syrien. 
Le premier objectif de cet article est de déconstruire et de comparer les discours européen et
israélien  concernant  le  Printemps arabe,  en  analysant  plus  spécifiquement  l’équilibre  trouvé
entre  défense  de  valeurs  démocratiques  et  celle  d’intérêts  sécuritaires  par  chacun.  La
comparaison de ces discours est suivie d’une analyse des politiques israéliennes et européennes
introduites  afin  de  répondre  aux  défis  mais  aussi  aux  opportunités  représentés  par  les
évènements du Printemps arabe. 
Cet article montre finalement que malgré des perceptions fortement contrastées concernant leur
compréhension de la démocratie et de la sécurité dans la région, l’UE et ses États membres – et
plus particulièrement l’UE3, la France, l’Allemagne et le Royaume-Uni – et Israël ont réagi à ces
mouvements avec la même volonté de défendre leurs intérêts et d’adapter leurs politiques à ce
nouvel environnement régional. Ces deux acteurs se sont en effet évertués à tirer parti (ou au
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